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Abstract 
The Public performance indicator (PPI) is an important Key Performance Indicator for Network Rail and monitored carefully by the 
organisation and their external stakeholders. Condition monitoring is of increasing interest within network rail as a suitable method for 
increasing asset reliability and improving the PPI metric. As condition monitoring methods are identified each will need assessment to establish 
the cost and benefit. Benefit can be measured in cost savings as poor PPI performance results in fines. Within many industries Net Present 
Value (NPV) calculations are used to determine how quickly investments will break-even. Cost-risk is a term that is used to describe the 
financial impact of an unexpected event (a risk). This paper outlines a more detailed approach to calculating NPV which considers the cost-risk 
effect of changes of the denial of service charging rate. NPV prediction is of importance when assessing when to deploy different fault 
detection strategies to maintenance issues, and therefore the cost-risk of the NPV calculation should be used to support asset management 
decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Cost engineering methods have seen a diversification of 
interest over recent years: where the traditional challenges of 
accurately determining and reducing cost of producing a 
product have expanded to include the challenge of considering 
the whole life cost (WLC) of the product. This mirrors the 
shift within the manufacturing industry towards seeing the 
product as a component of a delivered service. This 
servitization concept is gaining interest in many industrial 
sectors [1]. Rolls Royce, for example, are moving away from 
selling engines and move towards supplying “power by the 
hour” [2]. This shifting focus has meant that cost engineering, 
with its interests in cost estimation and cost control, has had to 
increasingly consider the WLC of a product or service and in 
particular the cost of maintenance has become a topical issue. 
As maintenance has increased in interest to cost engineering 
research, the traditional focus on manufacturing has become 
too specific and organisations with asset-management 
challenges have become more relevant. 
 
One of the challenges cost engineers in industry and 
academia often face is to advise on the possible risk mitigation 
choices and predict cost consequences [3]. NASA has a strong 
interest in estimates being prepared with cost-risk factored 
into the estimate. Cost-risk assessment involves identification 
of risk and a translation of those risks into cost impact [3]. 
Within this paper changes in denial of service charging rates is 
considered a risk, the financial consequences of which 
constitute the cost-risk. 
 
In maintenance condition based monitoring might be 
considered industry best practice, but this approach brings 
with it costs that need examining if a data-driven decision on 
the choice of maintenance strategy is to be made. A 
consideration of the issues surrounding cost of condition 
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monitoring data has been previously presented [4], in which 
the cost relevant issues related to data gathering and data 
storage were given focus.  
This paper will seek to examine the specifics of the 
situation at Network Rail by outlining cost-risk caused by 
Office of Rail Regulation decisions that potentially endanger 
installation of condition monitoring projects. This is done by 
showing a development of an existing case study with further 
cost-risk details being applied to the Net Present Value (NPV) 
calculation. 
 
 
2. Background 
Determining the cost of asset ownership is a challenge 
faced in many industries and organisations: NATO [5] and the 
defence industry have well defined terminology but continue 
to struggle to accurately calculate life-cycle cost, whole-life 
cycle cost and total ownership cost.  Within the oil & gas 
industry methods like Markov-chain to predict the cost of 
maintenance [6] or Real Options (RO) are used to make cost-
efficient decisions over the life-cycle [7].  
 
Often the first stage of a WLC assessment is the Net-
present value (NPV) calculation, which is used to indicate the 
return achieved from an investment. Commonly used in the 
oil and gas industry and financial sector as well as less 
obvious sectors such as the PV solar energy [8], NPV 
predictions are an important part of the decision process when 
considering the feasibility of a given project [9].  
 
One of the methods that better technologies can benefit NR 
is to reduce the costs associated with denial of service. The 
framework for payments between train operating companies 
(TOC’s) is referred to as “schedule 8” within the rail industry. 
Schedule 8 is overseen by the Office of Rail Regulation 
(ORR) and was updated at the start of the latest control period 
(CP5). The stated intention is for the schedule 8 targets and 
rates to be cost-neutral between TOC’s and NR. A change in 
the rate of schedule 8 by the ORR is a risk that significantly 
influences the NPV calculation for a condition monitoring 
project. 
 
The PPI is a key performance indicator within Network 
Rail and of significance for several reasons:  
 
• PPI results are made available to the public. Therefore 
poor performance results in damage to the organisations brand 
and sufficient public and/or media attention can result in 
political intervention 
 
• PPI and denial of service are related. A financial penalty 
is paid to a train operating company (TOC) when denial of 
service is caused by Network Rail. 
 
The work of Marquez et al. [10] use expected values of the 
schedule 8 costs to calculate the “penalty saving”. Penalty 
saving and reduction of maintenance costs are the two cost 
components that could be responsible for eventually making 
an investment in condition monitoring systems “break-even” 
(producing a positive NPV). Within the calculations presented 
by Marquez [9] the quickest that the point actuator condition 
monitoring system “pays” for itself is less than 8 years. As 
this is longer than a rail industry CP, it is worth noting that the 
Office of Rail Regulation is therefore very likely to reset both 
the target quantity of permitted delay minutes and the 
payment rate between NR and the TOC’s. This adds a 
significant risk to the calculation and therefore it is a much 
more complex issue to calculate the “break-even point” than 
previously thought. 
 
Looking at the recent trend for the penalty minute rate to 
rise we might draw the conclusion that this is a good thing 
that will likely make better equipment, technology or methods 
more cost effective, (in addition to the original intention of 
providing a strong incentive to achieve a punctual train 
service). The schedule 8 fees are only part of the discussion.  
 
Fig. 1: Illustrative comparison between the assumed and real situation 
 
The seemingly good news from raising schedule 8 rates is 
strongly mitigated by the Office of Rail Regulation setting the 
target for delay minute totals across the network. If NR 
reduces the delays across the network then the Office of Rail 
Regulation will eventually make the targets more difficult to 
achieve. The minutes saved no longer are working towards 
over-achieving the targets set by the Office of Rail 
Regulation, but are required to achieve expected performance. 
In effect, a change in targets will lower the number of “saved” 
delay minutes. 
 
Figure 1 shows the schedule 8 related return on investment 
rate in schematic form, where denial of service related cash 
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flow is graphed against time. The illustrative equipment is 
installed part way through CP4. We therefore see that the 
intention from Office of Rail Regulation to make NR 
performance better could well result in unintended 
consequences. Therefore it is clear that NR need to consider 
the cost-risk caused by uncertainty in both penalty fines and 
targets for total delay minutes if NPV calculations are to be 
meaningful. 
 
Relevant to this is the work of Mouter et al. [11] which 
reviews the problems that occur when presenting decision 
makers with uncertainty information during cost-benefit 
analysis. While the topics covered in that paper are outside the 
scope of this work, it is worth mentioning as it highlights the 
problems likely to occur if uncertainty information is 
presented. 
 
 
3. NPV Estimation Methodology 
The form of a simple NPV estimation is shown in equation 
1 [10]: 
    (1) 
 
Where NPV is the net present value. CF is the cash flow, 
and k is the rate of return.  Equation 1 can be expanded into 
equation 2 [10]: 
 
     (2) 
 
Which assumes that the schedule 8 rates involved are constant 
between times t=1 and T. I0 is the initial expenditure (in this 
example, cost of condition monitoring equipment and the cost 
of installation. 
 
The above function can trend positively or negatively 
depending on the values. The work of Marquez et al. [10] 
explored the impact of a range of schedule 8 rates to explore 
the range of rates that are in place on the network and the 
expected number of saved minutes from the introduction of 
condition monitoring. The issue of the Office of Rail 
Regulation changing the schedule 8 rates each CP was not 
explored by Marquez et al. [10].  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: NPV when targets and rates are kept constant 
 
Figure 2 shows the most consistent case; where targets for 
delay minutes and rates are kept constant. This makes 
planning easier for Network Rail, however the Office of Rail 
Regulation has shown a willingness to change these rates in 
the past. A change to the schedule 8 costs can be represented 
in the NPV calculation by requiring summation over two 
different time periods, using different cash-flow values. 
 
(3) 
 
The changes between equations 2 and 3 allow for a step 
change within the regulation. CFt and CFt’ are the different 
cash-flow values from the different CP’s. 
The value of examining the potential uncertainty of the CFt 
values is that it allows an organisation to better assess its 
improvement plans and avoid making costly investments that 
have a probability of not providing a positive return. 
 
4. Results 
To add to the previous scenario examined by Marquez et 
al. [10], two further cases were considered; a best-case 
scenario (where the regulator makes extremely favourable 
decisions) and a worst-case scenario. The worst case scenario 
represents a situation where the regulator very dramatically 
reduces schedule 8 fines. These two scenarios are used as 
possible boundaries for what will happen during the following 
control period. 
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Fig 3: Diverging NPV values due to different cost-risk scenarios 
 
Without any Office of Rail Regulation adjustments the 
expected break-even point was between years 8 and 9. The 
above “worst-case” is a situation where the schedule 8 rate is 
reduced by 50% (to 42.5 GBP/delay minute) The “best-case” 
scenario assumes a schedule 8 rate increase by 150% of 
previous (to 127.5 GBP/delay minute).  
 
The break-even point is between years 6 and 7 for the best-
case scenario while the worst-case scenario indicates that the 
capital investment will not break-even. For both the “best-
case” and “worst-case” scenarios the number of delay minutes 
influenced by the RCM equipment was not changed. 
 
5. Discussion 
NPV is used widely within a range of industries for 
decision making on feasibility of projects. Often this analysis 
has to use uncertain information and be aware of the cost-risk 
factors that can influence the analysis. The discussion of this 
problem has focused on NR deploying improvements the 
situation applies just as much for the TOC’s. The analysis 
presented here of the NPV should be of keen interest to the 
rail industry within the UK. Indeed, the arrangement of 
separate rail infrastructure and train operating organisations is 
not unique to the UK, anywhere with a system of delay 
related penalty fees being paid between organisations is very 
likely to have similar problems with calculating breakeven 
points using NPV. 
 
While this analysis is still in a preliminary stage, the 
influence of this sort of analysis will be of broader interest 
once the WLC analysis is completed in more detail. The 
difficulty will be in making sensible schedule 8 cost 
predictions over the many CP’s included in a WLC estimate: 
the range of uncertainty is likely to be very large. It is sensible 
to wonder if such swings in the schedule 8 fine rate are 
possible: those within the UK rail industry will know that 
between CP4 and CP5 the schedule 8 fine rate approximately 
doubled. Such dramatic changes in the regulatory 
environment will almost certainly result in the industry (and 
NR in particular) becoming concerned with the risk involved 
in such events. With the regulator making such dramatic 
decisions the “best-case” and “worst-case” scenarios explored 
here are shown to be conservative. 
 
NR has previously released data from the TRUST system, 
which includes details of the delays experienced on the 
network, the fines that are levied and the number of delayed 
minutes caused. Analysis of this data provided a typical 
cost/delay-minute of 47.22 GBP (this value was derived by 
assuming that “capped” and “pinned” trains were billed 
separately).  This figure is similar to the worst-case scenario, 
and implies that the project explored within Marquez et al. 
[10] will likely never break-even. Another implication of this 
calculated value is that the broader network would not benefit 
from such an expensive condition monitoring approach and 
that it might be reserved for the truly critical points of the 
network where traffic and the schedule 8 rates are both high. 
 
Another issue that might be considered is that the initial 
cost of the RCM system is unfeasibly high. While this paper 
has sought (as closely as possible) to follow the calculations 
done by Marquez et al. [10] and used the equipment and 
installation costs as presented within that source. Further work 
should reveal if the switch actuator condition monitoring 
equipment cost of ~200k GBP are sensible. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that the paper of Marquez et al. 
[10] was published in 2008 and used data from 2006. Their 
analysis therefore has a rate of return of 8% and that 
represents a relatively booming economy, where return on 
investment is quite high. Considering the recession of recent 
years this rate of return might be considered inaccurate. 
Performing the calculations with a lower rate of return makes 
the RCM more feasible more quickly; indeed, “The pre-tax 
allowed Rate of Return for Control Period 5, to be used for 
the purpose of 3rd party investments carried out under the 
investment framework, is set at 4.93%” [12]. Lower expected 
rates of return helps to make projects quickly break-even. The 
effects of different rates of return might be considered more 
minor than the schedule 8 related costs-risk, however over a 
longer time period such risk could become considerable. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The method of how the Office of Rail Regulation sets 
targets at the network level is clearly of significance to 
decision making within the Rail industry. The Office of Rail 
Regulation can be assumed to examine past performance, but 
if there are models that are used to predict and forecast the 
networks behaviour these would be extremely interesting.  
Considering the schedule 8 related cost-risk we might 
reasonably expect NR to respond by deploying projects with 
lower initial capital cost, particularly if the analysis indicates 
that the NPV is positive before the end of the CP. Such a 
reaction is clearly against the intention of the Office of Rail 
Regulation. The PPI is an important metric within Network 
Rail and the policy might be to deploy better 
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technology/methods into some applications knowing that the 
investment will not break-even. 
 
To build further upon the analysis presented here a more 
detailed WLC cost estimate should be prepared and the cost-
risk associated with denial of service considered. Then a more 
detailed method for assessment of value can be made for the 
approx. 60 year life-cycles expected. 
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